Background and Motivation
In the past decades, banking has become global and the ratio of credit over GDP has surged. Banking systems are much larger than they used to be and have a greater exposure to international shocks. Internationally active banks have thus been at the core of discussions on the causes and effects of the international financial crisis. Policymakers have stated their intention "to manage capital flows in order to deal with the risks and reap the benefits of cross-border capital flows", recognizing that "central banks play a major role in addressing global liquidity shocks". sector policy interventions, such as bank-specific use of special lending facilities. The datasets available at the national level differ with regard to their granularity, but they allow the researchers to combine information on flows of funds through banks with balance sheet characteristics of banks. Beyond applying a common analytical framework, each country contribution provides a narrative which is specific to its national experience. Some examples are the importance of the Vienna Initiative for Austrian banks (Segalla 2014) , the distinction between foreign branches and subsidiaries for German banks (Kerl and Koch 2014) , or the importance of foreign exchange loans for Poland (Pawlowska et al. 2014) . Countries have banks also play different roles in international financial markets. For example, Ireland (Everett et al. 2014) and Poland are largely hosts to foreign-owned banks while the United
States (Correa et al. 2014) , Germany, and the United Kingdom (Hills et al. 2014 ) are the homes of many banks with foreign affiliates.
We set up a meta analysis in order to summarize the results of the 11 studies. Meta analyses characterize the results across empirical studies by asking which features of the regression sample affect an outcome or the explanatory power of a particular empirical model (Boockmann 2010 , Card and Krueger 1995 , Doucouliagos and Stanley 2008 . The empirical studies we summarize are very homogenous across countries because all teams used the same baseline regression model, even if the variable definitions and samples of banks can differ along specific dimensions. Hence, we do not have to deal with issues such as publication bias which affect meta analyses that draw on published research only. Within our meta analysis, we use the probability that the effect of a particular variable has a significant impact on lending as a function of variables such as the number of banks included, the type of banking activity (domestic versus cross-border lending versus lending internal to the organization), or the type of banks (those with versus without foreign affiliates).
The studies show that the lending responses of domestic banks (those without foreign affiliates) to liquidity risk do not depend on banks' balance sheet characteristics in a consistent way across countries. By contrast, the studies find interesting distinctions across global banks (those with foreign affiliates) in transmission of liquidity risk into lending. 3 The meta analysis identifies the following tendencies in liquidity risk transmission:
• Across regression specification, explanatory power is higher when the dependent variable is domestic loan growth, compared with specifications focussed on intra-bank net lending or cross-border lending.
• How liquidity risk affects lending of banks with different balance sheet structures depends on the time period considered. Responses in more "normal" periods, when banks are not accessing official liquidity facilities, differ from those in periods when banks access these facilities. Bank use of official liquidity facilities tends to replace funding support drawn from affiliated offices.
• Internal capital market activity within banks matters for lending stability. Banks operating within host markets support lending to a greater degree in times of increased liquidity risk if the banks have higher net borrowing from (or lower net lending to) the rest of their organizations.
3 Depending on the country, these banks can be domestically-owned with affiliates located outside of their country, or they can be foreign-owned banks operating in a country that is largely a host for the global banks.
• While balance sheets factors sometimes drive cross-sectional differences in domestic lending growth by banks, balance sheet factors matter most consistently for cross-border lending growth changes in response to liquidity risk conditions. It is noteworthy, however, that no single balance sheet factor drives lending results in the same way across all countries.
In Section 2, we provide descriptive statistics on the evolution of international banking during the crisis. Section 3 briefly summarizes previous literature in the field and lays out the common empirical methodology. Section 4 summarizes the main results from meta-analysis study. Section 5 concludes, also stressing that the meta analysis is a complement to, but not a substitute for, the rich insights include in the individual country analyses contained within the papers of the symposium.
The Big Picture
The past decades have witnessed a significant increase in bank credit, both domestically and across borders. This expansion of international credit has come to an abrupt halt since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 /2008 . Between 2000 and 2007 , the ratio of credit over GDP expanded from close to 100% to an average of 120% in the countries under study; at the end of 2012, it stood at an even higher 125% of GDP. Cross-border credit, in contrast, doubled from about 30% to 66% of GDP before the crisis but declined to 55% subsequently.
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These findings are consistent with observations that global liquidity fell more than domestic liquidity in the wake of the crisis (BIS CGFS 2011), but also has not fully recovered.
Data on cross-border banking activities as provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) are particularly useful for illustrating some of the dynamics of the crises (Figure 1 ). While lending to bank and nonbank counterparties sharply contracted initially, bank-to-bank lending has remained at lower levels while the lending to private non-bank customers rebounded more quickly. The build up of cross-border assets before the crisis and the subsequent withdrawal from foreign markets, as also reflected in stocks of outstanding 4 Data on annual net domestic credit (IFS line 32) and GDP are taken from the IMF and The World Bank. To convert net domestic credit from local currency to US-Dollar, we construct the annual exchange rate as implied by the conversion of GDP in local currency to GDP in US-Dollar. Data on cross-border credit are taken from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. The corresponding numbers using the Consolidated Banking Statistics increased from 30% to 61% of GDP before the crisis and declined subsequently to 56%. Ireland, in contrast, show a longer and deeper boom-bust-cycle as domestic lending increased before the crisis, to be followed by a contraction through 2011. In Canada and, even more pronounced, in Poland, domestic lending has increased throughout.
Foreign loans by banks follow different patterns than domestic loans. The boom-bustcycle is again quite pronounced for Ireland's banks. Canadian banks increased foreign loans during the period when US foreign loans contract, with a common growth trajectory afterwards. German and Polish banks have contracted their foreign loans. In this sense, the withdrawal from foreign markets during the crisis has been a European phenomenon. This increasing "home bias" is stressed by the country studies for British and German banks (Hills et al. 2014, Kerl and Koch 2014) .
Finally, two panels show the pattern of net lending between banks and their affiliates, separately displayed due to the differences in scales of change for the U.S. and German banks as compared with the Ireland and Canada banks. First, observe that banks in all four countries were net debtors relative to their affiliates at least through 2010. These affiliates served as net funding sources, not for all banks within each country, but for all these countries overall during the early sample period. Net volumes through internal capital markets varied considerably over time, particularly for Canada and Ireland, and even reversed direction on balance for the U.S. and Irish banks.
Theoretical Background and Empirical Method
The papers in this symposium ask two main research questions: First, how does liquidity risk affect banking lending, both at home and abroad? Second, how does this response differ across banks and countries? These questions are not new -they are, in fact, at the heart of studies analyzing the impact of the banking system on the real economy -but previous literature could not answer these questions from a comparative cross-country perspective. In this section, we thus explain how research in the IBRN adds to previous literature and how we tackle the issue of identifying shock transmission through internationally active banks.
Previous Literature
Until recently, research on international banking has been a relatively underdeveloped field in international economics and international business. This reflects the lack of a consistent theoretical framework to analyze international banking activities. But it also reflects a lack of access to relevant bank-level data. In recent years, theoretical and empirical research on international banking has made significant progress.
Two strands of theoretical literature are particularly relevant for the research conducted in the IBRN. The first deals with the effects of the integration of banking markets for financial stability. In their seminal work on the contagious effects of liquidity shocks, Allen and Gale (2000) show that the link between financial integration and the risk of financial contagion is Empirical studies have shifted focus to the transmission of shocks through internationally active banks. 6 Rosengren (1997, 2000) documented the transmission of asset price shocks originating in Japan to the United States, exploiting the fact that these shocks were exogenous to the banks affected and that the presence of Japanese banks in the United States varied across regions. In terms of the bank-level characteristics that affect shock transmission, recent literature has provided at least two main insights. First, balance sheet strength matters. Several studies show that access to a stable funding base of (local) deposits and the strength of the capital buffer of the (foreign) In sum, empirical research on the impact of liquidity shocks on bank lending should take into account the nature of the shock (bank-specific versus global), the balance sheet structure, the degree of internationalization of the bank under study, and the role of public sector liquidity support. In exploring the effects of liquidity shocks, the key challenge is the identification of loan demand and supply effects across banks. The approach that papers in this volume follow is to explain heterogeneity across banks (and countries) in order to identify a loan supply effect. In the following, we describe our approach towards "identification through heterogeneity" (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 1995) .
Theoretical Justification of Loan Specification
The country studies in this volume show changes in lending by banks in response to changes in liquidity risk as a function of bank-specific characteristics and the pricing and availability of official sector liquidity. In this section, we provide theoretical justification for the specifications. We begin with the Khwaja and Mian (2008, KM2008) 
Baseline Model
In period t, a representative bank i and firm j negotiate a loan of size 
The first term on the right hand side of (1) is a constant and thus the common shock affecting all transactions. This common effect is captured by a time fixed effect (or a countrytime fixed effect if the data span several countries). The second term is idiosyncratic to the bank but transmitted to all borrowers of that specific bank. KM2008 interpret i t δ as the bankspecific change in access to deposits. While KM2008 exclusively focus on the cross-sectional adjustment at a point in time, we exploit the time series variation in lending as well. Liquidity risk has two dimensions. On the asset side, it refers to the structure of a bank's assets and thus captures the share of assets that can be converted into cash quickly. On 7 Brueggemann, Kleinert and Prieto (2011) provide a gravity model for banks and show how bank-firm level relationships can be aggregated up at the country-level.
the liability side, liquidity risk refers to rollover risk, i.e. the risk of not being able to refinance short-term debt as it becomes due. Our examination starts with a liquidity risk time series c t r that is common across all banks i within some country c and that is proxied by the LIBOR-OIS spread. 8 The exposure of a specific bank to liquidity risk thus depends on the strength of its balance sheet (CMST2011). We capture balance sheet strength through a vector i t χ , which could include the proportion of deposits in bank funding, the share of assets that are illiquid, or outstanding credit commitments.
We substitute 
1 1
The interactions between i c t t r χ ⋅ ∆ show which balance sheet characteristics of banks drive responses of lending to liquidity risk.
The Role of Official Sector Liquidity
While specification (2) holds in "normal" periods, it may yield biased estimates of the effects of liquidity risks in periods when banks access liquidity provided by central banks (or other public sector sources). The availability and use of official liquidity at a price below Additionally, a larger group of i t χ banks (with characteristics between i = 1 and i = 2) are subject to the kinked effective cost of funds due to the availability of attractively priced public funding at date 1 t . The bias in empirical specifications becomes even more pronounced in models which assume linearities and ignore the role of public sector funding and emergency lending in crises episodes.
Translation to an IBRN Empirical Specification
The framework described above maps into an IBRN empirical specification which has two basic methodological antecedents. The first is CMST2011 who examined the role of exante bank balance sheet composition in explaining the ex-post differences across large and small U.S. banks in terms of balance sheet adjustment to liquidity risk conditions. The second is the work by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012c) who focus on global banks, which are those with foreign affiliates.
Within the IBRN initiative, the respective country teams delineate types of banks that are particularly relevant for their economies. For example, IBRN countries distinguish across three characteristics: bank size (small versus large), banks with or without foreign affiliates, and bank type. Some countries also contrast the responses of domestic lending versus funding, and lending with related and unrelated counterparties at home and abroad. Where data availability permits, some IBRN studies are able to explicitly test for the kinked response to liquidity risk under the presence of an official sector liquidity facility.
The main regression specification appears as:
where it Y corresponds to bank i balance sheet items that could affect the response of lending to liquidity risk exposures. Most countries, given our focus on lending and credit, explore loans to domestic counterparties and loans to foreign counterparties, all scaled by bank assets.
Some countries have data on domestic banks with foreign affiliates, and can also consider local claims extended by these affiliates and net due to balances (which capture the net internal borrowing of the parent bank from its foreign affiliates). 9 Some countries also follow the CMST2011 specification more closely by including liquid assets and credit extension.
, 1 i t χ − is a vector of lagged control variables that captures the degree to which a bank is exposed to liquidity risk through ex ante balance sheet composition and market access.
Balance sheet composition is captured through bank-specific data on lagged illiquid asset share, the share of deposits in bank funding, the size of outstanding unused commitments, and bank capital. Because some of the banks have affiliates with which they can borrow and lend through internal capital markets, some specifications include related net due to shares in funding. As in CMST2011, we refrain from interpreting the role of bank size in the specifications given its multiple potential implications. The impact of size on exposure to liquidity risk is, in fact, not clear a priori. Large banks, for example, might have better opportunities to diversify risk but may, at the same time, be exposed to systemic risk to a greater degree. 
Overview of Key Cross-Country Results
The 11 country studies included in this symposium apply the common methodology to a time frame of approximately 2006 through 2013, generally using quarterly data. The liquidity shock variables are country specific, and explanatory variables are defined in similar but not identical ways due to local reporting conventions. Some countries have banks that are purely domestically focused alongside banks with global affiliates. Other countries primarily serve as the host countries for domestic subsidiaries of foreign parents. The studies account 12 A core funding location for bank i is a location where the local foreign offices fund their operations largely through local borrowing; a core investment location for bank i is a location that represents a large share of overall foreign investments (claims) of bank i.
for differences in business models of banks, differences in national banking systems, and differences in access to official liquidity support.
In this section, we summarize the results of the country studies on banks' responses to liquidity risk during the crisis. We focus on a subset of empirical specifications, leaving the details, the rich idiosyncratic narratives, and additional specifications to each of the individual papers. We describe results that cover two main groupings of banks -banks with foreign affiliates, and banks without foreign affiliates -and four key dependent variables -changes in domestic loans, cross-border loans, local claims, and net due to parents, reflecting the net borrowing from the domestic location vis-à-vis the rest of the organization. Table 1 shows the number of countries providing regression specifications and the total number of specifications across these countries for each dependent variable such as changes in domestic loans, in cross-border loans, in local claims, and in net due to of the parent bank. 13 For example, 10 countries report specifications using a sample of banks with foreign affiliates to study domestic loan sensitivity, with 20 regression specifications of the form of equation (1), differing in the particular samples of included banks. For example some countries have separate specifications for larger banks versus smaller banks, or foreignownership versus domestic-ownership, or branches versus subsidiaries of respective owners. 9
Descriptive Statistics
of the 10 countries provide specifications covering cross-border or foreign lending, in addition to domestic lending, while 7 of the 10 countries are able to examine the effects of liquidity risk on internal capital market flows through banks as reflected in their Net Due To balances.
We next provide an overview of the pattern of statistical significance of the interactions between the different balance sheet characteristics of banks (deposits, capital, or ex ante net due to) and the Libor-OIS spreads across the regression specifications already profiled in Table 1 . We take a 10 percent level of statistical significance on the estimated regression coefficients β , which measure whether the response of bank lending to a liquidity shock runs through a particular balance sheet variable. We also consider the incidence of statistical significance of these same balance sheet characteristics in periods when banks access official sector liquidity support, as reflected in the 1 1 β α + coefficients described in equation (3). 14 It is important to note that the type of official liquidity support the studies look at differs across countries. For example, in the study of banks in Germany the authors use information on guarantees and capital injections provided for distress banks (Kerl and Koch 2014) , while the study of banks in the United States uses information on draws on the discount window and the term auction facility.
There are two parts to the only non-zero entry, so are the only variable interacted with LIBOR-OIS that are associated with higher cross-sectional growth of domestic loans, and this occurs in 3 of the 7 regression specifications. This channel of support for cross-sectional differences in domestic loan growth disappears during periods when banks access official liquidity, and from comparing columns (a) and (b), it even turns negative and significant in one case. Particularly striking from these first columns of Table 2a are how seldom these balance-sheet variables explain cross-sectional differences in loan growth as liquidity conditions change, and in the sample of banks without foreign affiliates. Also striking is that features that tend to support more domestic loan growth can have the opposite effect in explaining cross-sectional differences in cross-border lending growth. Generally, the results of Table 2a show that the balance sheet differences across banks generally are typically not very important for explaining variation in lending of banks without foreign affiliates as liquidity risk conditions evolve. For these banks, most of the cross-sectional variation in lending growth is absorbed by bank fixed effects.
The picture of statistical significance is very different when countries explore the micro-data on banks with foreign affiliates. The corresponding results are provided under the heading of banks with foreign affiliates for the rightmost columns of results in Table 2a .
Looking down the respective columns it is clear from the non-zero entries that cross-sectional variation across banks in growth of domestic loans, cross-border loans, and "net due to" are in Table 2b considers whether the patterns of findings just profiled occur across a group of countries, or whether they are concentrated within specific country regressions among the 10 countries included. In this alternative table variant, we focus only on providing a counterpart to columns (a) and (b) of Table 2a , but now also introducing the names of the countries that find positive or negative statistical significance of a liquidity risk transmission "channel". Next to the names of the countries, we indicate in parentheses the number of specifications for that country associated with this statistical significance. 15 Recall also that a smaller group of countries have analyzed the internal capital market flows by their banks.
For example, consider the specifications under the column headings of banks with foreign affiliates (which are either domestic banks with external affiliates, or foreign banks operating within a country, depending on the reporting country). Numerous country names are represented in these columns, showing the incidence of statistical significance of particular balance sheet characteristics in the country specifications captured by our meta-analysis.
Cross-sectional differences in domestic lending growth in response to changing liquidity risk are linked to different factors in respective countries. In periods without official liquidity use, net due balances matter for banks in the U.S., Ireland, and Germany, although these balances cease to drive cross-sectional differences across banks in domestic lending when banks are accessing official liquidity. Ex ante differences across banks in deposit shares are correlated with domestic lending growth responses to liquidity risk for banks in Ireland and the United Kingdom, but in different directions. Turning to columns under cross-border loan growth, the studies show that variability across banks in response to liquidity risk is tied to a broader set of balance sheet variables, whether illiquid asset shares, deposit funding, commitment ratios, tier 1 capital holdings, or use of internal capital markets.
Results of the Meta Regressions
To analyze the regression results in a more systemic fashion that accounts for differences across countries and regression specifications, we next turn to a meta analysis, following the approach of previous applications such as in labor economics (Boockmann 2010 , Card and Krueger 1995 , Doucouliagos and Stanley 2008 . We first examine the sample and specification features that are associated with the explanatory power for regressions. We then focus more specifically on the features associated with significant roles for deposit funding, internal capital markets, and official liquidity support in loan growth response to liquidity risk.
The result of the meta analysis are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 uses the regression R² as the dependent variable. Because the range of the R² across countries is relatively large, we include country fixed effects in all regressions. Given that the R² is bound between 0 and 1, we run a censored Tobit model with robust standard errors. Next, in Table 4, we explore through which balance sheet variables liquidity shocks affect bank lending. We use a probit model with robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are not included because of their colinearity with the number of banks. The dependent variable in these regressions is a 0/1-dummy which is set equal to one if the interaction between liquidity shocks and bank balance sheet characteristics is significant at least at the 10%-level. We run these regressions for three explanatory variables: deposit funding, net due to, and official support.
Consider first the explanatory power of regression specifications, as presented in Table 3 . Columns (1) through (7) of this table provide results for specification R² statistics, while column (8) used adjusted R² as the dependent variable. A waterfall structure across columns (1) through (5) separately considers different regression dependent variables in the country specifications. Generally, increasing the number of banks (for a given time series dimension of the data) lowers the explanatory power of our model. This shows the impact of bank-level heterogeneity for our results. Also, regression specifications have higher R² for countries when domestic loans is the dependent variable, indicating the relative stability of growth these loans compared to the alternative forms of lending considered across countries.
Net due to, cross-border loans or foreign office loans tend to be more volatile over time and cross-sectionally within countries, which tends to lower the R² in these regressions.
Regression specifications with bank fixed effects have marginally higher fits, but tend to not change the overall pattern of results of the specifications. Table 4 compares the regression sample features associated with significant roles of internal capital market balances, deposit shares, and use of official support in the crosssectional distinctions among banks in liquidity risk transmission into lending. 85 of the total of 127 specifications contain the net due measure. All 127 specifications contain a measure of deposit share in funding. 103 of the regression specifications contain a measure of official support utilized by banks and facilitating a distinction of results across "normal" and "stress" periods when official sector liquidity is substituting for private liquidity on bank balance sheets. Table 4 is set up with a waterfall structure, so we are able to determine if there are particular types of lending which tend to be more sensitive to these three features.
From Column 1, we observe that net due balances are more likely to be significant for liquidity risk transmission within specifications that have a larger number of banks reporting.
Column 2 shows that the country specifications on adjustments of internal capital market positions in response to liquidity risk are significantly less likely to be sensitive to ex ante positions of net borrowing in the organization, when contrasted with specifications covering other forms of lending. Specification (4) shows that internal capital market positions are more likely to matter for cross-sectional differences in domestic lending compared with the other types of bank lending. Table 4 columns (6) through (10) explore the importance of deposit funding in explaining cross-sectional differences across banks in loan responses to liquidity risk. The main driver is whether specifications cover the banks without foreign affiliates, as it is this group in which deposit funding matters the most, regardless of type of lending conducted. The
French study argues that, rather than proxying for the specific funding strategy of a given bank, the share of deposit funding proxies for the business model and the degree of risk aversion of banks (Bussiere et al. 2014) . Similarly, the UK study finds that banks which rely on deposits cut back external lending and raise domestic lending by more (Hills et al. 2014 ).
In general, the mixed and relatively weak role of deposits in driving liquidity risk effects across countries might be a result of conflating more stable bank funding balances with more domestically-oriented loan portfolios as core businesses of banks.
Finally, columns (11) Third, internationally active banks have access to and have used an additional channel of adjustment to liquidity risk, both during normal times and during the crisis. Banks that increased net borrowing affiliates as liquidity risk rose supported domestic and cross-border lending in some instances, but this result did not always hold.
Fourth, a stronger general result is that cross-border lending growth is more sensitive to liquidity risk in relation to the balance sheet characteristics of the banks. One interpretation is that banks may subordinate cross-border lending relative to domestic lending activity as stress conditions change. This same pattern of results did not in general show up in the changes in bank lending conducted through the foreign branches and subsidiaries of these same banks. In general though, no single balance sheet factor affects banks' exposure to liquidity risk in a consistent way across time and across countries (or banks).
Generally, the explanatory power of the empirical model is weaker the larger the number of banks. In other words, banks are heterogeneous in their lending patterns, and specifications with larger numbers of banks -regardless of being domestic or global bankshave more unexplained heterogeneity. Heterogeneity which reflects differences in bank business models may contribute to an enhanced resilience of the system. At the same time, a large degree of heterogeneity in which balance sheet characteristics are associated with more volatile responses by banks also complicates finding appropriate regulatory responses.
In conclusion, the formation of the IBRN and the studies of this symposium represent the first systemic cross-country work using individual bank micro-data using a common methodology that is comparable across countries. This work provides an important example of the benefits of international collaboration and communications between researchers in academia and central banks from around the world. Such collaboration helps support the common goals of macroeconomic stability and financial stability. These efforts also provide lessons that inform appropriate regulatory responses to liquidity risks and other shocks by providing comparable cross country evidence from the recent crisis.
While the IBRN will move forward with tackling research questions, there are still broad agendas that all countries face on issues regarding data. One big advantage of the IBRN network is the ability to access similar and very detailed datasets across countries. At the same time, our analysis has been constrained by gaps in the collection and availability of data within and across countries on banks and on policy interventions. The successful and ongoing cross-country research efforts in this symposium highlight the benefits of continuing efforts to collaborate across countries and to improve the availability, coverage, and granularity of micro-banking data for academic research and policy analysis. Illiquid assets This Table reports the results of Tobit regressions, using the regression R² as the dependent variable (columns (1)- (7)). The regressions account for the fact that the dependent variable has an upper (1) and a lower bound (0). Column (8) used the adjusted R² as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level.
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